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ALDRICH v. ALDRICH
the nature of the actor's conduct, the interest sought to
be advanced by the actor, the expectancy with which it
interferes, and the social interests involved in allowing this
freedom of action,2'9 as weighed against the harm that this
conduct would produce." Such a rationale would put an
end to the semantic problems of whether the inducing
party has caused a breach or a termination of contract,
since the basic issue would be the nature of the conduct,
rather than the nature of the contract13 Furthermore, it
would allow the courts to divest themselves of artificial
tests and employ the more realistic approach of deciding
particular cases according to the circumstances. The effect
of this approach would be to establish a cause of action in
tort for unprivileged interference with contractual rela-
tions.
One might ultimately be left with the question of what
effect a termination at will clause would have in a contract.
The answer is best described in a statement in a recent
New York case, Terry v. Dairyman's League Co-Operative
Ass'n,2 "The fact that the contract is terminable at will
greatly broadens the scope of the defendant's privilege.
* * * Under the principles of the free enterprise system, that
privilege is a very broad one ... ." The approach of the
New York court is indeed a sound one and should be
accorded much weight in analyzing future cases in this tort
area. RONALD P. FISH
Conflict Of Laws: Refusal To Grant Full Faith And
Credit To A Foreign Judgment For Lack
Of Jurisdiction
Aldrich v. Aldrich'
In June, 1945 a Florida court granted M. L. Aldrich an
absolute divorce from M. S. Aldrich. The decree ordered
Because of the social interests involved, the courts almost uniformly
have held that marriage contracts merit special treatment and that it is
not a tort to induce parties to break them. See PRossER, TORTS § 106 at 727
(2d ed. 1955).
'*See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 767, at 63 (1939).
"See Cosmopolitan Film Distrib. v. Feuchtwanger Corp., 226 N.Y.S. 2d
584, 591 (1962), where the court stated that the issue involved was not
the type of business relationship claimed disturbed - a contract for a
definite term, one terminable at will, or an unenforceable promise - but
rather the actions of the third person in interfering with the relationship.
"157 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 78 (1956). See also a similar statement by the court
in Mitchell v. Aldrich, 122 Vt. 19,163 A. 2d 833, 836 (1960).
1127 S.E. 2d 385 (W.Va. 1962).
On November 12, 1963, the United States Supreme Court ordered the
parties to prepare proposed certificates for certification to the Su-
preme Court of Florida on the following questions:
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monthly alimony payments to the plaintiff and provided
that "in the event the defendant, Moriel Simeon Aldrich,
shall pre-decease the plaintiff, Marguerite Loretta Aldrich,
said monthly sum of $250 shall, upon the death of said de-
fendant, become a charge upon his estate during her life-
time, . . ." M. S. Aldrich paid the monthly award until his
death in 1958. The assets of his estate consisted in part of
ten acres of real property located in West Virginia.
In 1942 M. S. Aldrich and the plaintiff, as his wife, had
conveyed the land to their son, Edwin, who was a minor.
In 1946, after M. S. Aldrich had remarried, he and his new
wife conveyed the same land to William T. Aldrich, another
son, who is a beneficiary of his estate and one of the de-
fendants in the case.
The plaintiff charged in this complaint, filed in West
Virginia, that the conveyance to Edwin was without con-
sideration and that the land was a part of the estate of
M. S. Aldrich and was subject to the judgment of the
Florida court for alimony which had accrued since his
death. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
held that, although the Florida divorce court had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the parties and in rem jurisdiction
over the marriage, and had the power to render a valid
divorce decree, the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to
award alimony to extend beyond the death of the husband
and that the award of such alimony therefore was not
entitled to full faith and credit.
After stating the settled law that a judgment may be
collaterally attacked when it is shown that the foreign
court lacked jurisdiction, 2 the majority opinion reasoned
1. Is a decree of alimony that purports to bind the estate of a
deceased husband permissible, in the absence of an express prior
agreement between the two spouses authorizing or contemplating such
a decree?
2. If such a decree is not permissible, does the error of the court
entering it render that court without subject matter jurisdiction with
regard to that aspect of the cause?
3. If subject matter jurisdiction is thus lacking, may that defect be
challenged in Florida, after the time for appellate review has expired,
(i) by the representatives of the estate of the deceased husband or
(ii) by persons to whom the deceased husband has allegedly trans-
ferred part of his property without consideration?
4. If the decree is impermissible but not subject to such attack in
Florida for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by those mentioned in
subparagraph 3, may an attack be successfully based on this error of
law in the rendition of the decree? 32 Law Week 4006. Gert. granted,
32 LW 4006 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1963).
2 Rethorst v. Rethorst, 214 Md. 1, 133 A. 2d 101 (1957) ; Picking v. Local
Loan Co., 185 Md. 253, 44 A. 2d 462 (1945); Roach v. Jurchak, 182 Md.
646, 35 A. 2d 817 (1944) ; Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942) ; Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F. 2d
44 (2d Cir. 1957); Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932);
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that (1) the accepted common law rule in Florida, West
Virginia and in most states is that alimony payments shall
not survive the death of the husband in the absence of an
express agreement or property settlement between the
parties to the contrary;' (2) divorce proceedings are con-
trolled by statute and the Florida statute4 did not expressly
give the Florida court power to award alimony payments
to extend beyond the husband's death; and (3) a judgment
may be valid in part and void in part." Since the Florida
court did not have the power to award such alimony pay-
ments, it likewise did not have jurisdiction; hence this part
of the Florida divorce decree was void and not entitled to
full faith and creditY
Gavenda Brothers, Inc. v. Elkins Limestone Company, Inc., 145 W. Va.
732, 116 S.E. 2d 910 (1960) ; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889e (1947) ; RESTATE-
MIENT (Fifth), PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE § 404c, at 328; 56 Mich. L. Rev.
33 (1957).
8Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928); Blades v. Szatai,
151 Md. 644, 135 A. 841, 50 A.L.R. 232 (1927) ; Johnson v. Every, 93 So. 2d
390 (Fla. 1957); Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953);
Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933) ; Platt v. Davies, 82 Ohio
App. 182, 77 N.E. 2d 486 (1947) ; Foster v. Poster, 195 Va. 102, 77 S.E. 2d
471, 39 A.L.R. 2d 1397 (1953). Cf. Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2d 1406, 1409 (1953).
45 FLA. STAT. ANNO. (1947) § 65.08:
"In every decree of divorce in a suit by the wife, the court shall
make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money
of the wife, or any allowance to be made to her, and if any, the
security to be given for the same, as from the circumstances of the
parties and nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just; but no
alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife. In any award of
permanent alimony, the court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic
payments or payments in a lump sum."
Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 86 A. 2d 520 (1952); Spencer v.
Franks, 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A.L.R. 263 (1937); 30A Am. Jur.
Judgments § 20 (1940).
1 The majority determined that the Florida statute was founded on the
historical concept of alimony, that alimony is based on the duty of the
husband to support his wife, which duty naturally terminates upon the
death of either party. 17 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation §§ 560-570
(1938). The majority relied on three Florida cases: Johnson v. Every,
Underwood v. Underwood, and Allen v. Allen, supra, n. 5. In each case
the parties entered into an agreement prior to divorce whereby alimony
would survive the husband's death. The court held that such agreements
were valid. In the Allen case, the court said: "As a general rule the
obligation to pay alimony dies with the person, but agreements of the
husband to bind his representatives to do this have been upheld, hnd
there is no prohibition against them in this state." The court in the
Underwood case stated that such agreements to pay constituted property
settlements and not alimony. The majority of the West Virginia court
relied strongly on an extended quotation from the dissent in the Johnson
case and this somewhat ambiguous statement by the majority: "We sub-
scribe to the proposition that in the absence of an express contract or a
provision in a decree such as the one before us, a divorced husband's lia-
bility for alimony terminates with his death." The West Virginia court
concluded from this statement that "... it is evident that the reference
to the decree 'such as the one before' the court meant a decree based on
a contract."
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The dissenting judge7 argued that full faith and credit
cannot be refused for the reasons that (1) a final foreign
judgment is erroneous,8 (2) the foreign court applied the
wrong substantive law,9 or (3) there was an improper
exercise of jurisdiction.10 Further, he said it was not clear
that the Florida decree was erroneous, applying either
Florida law" or West Virginia law,12 and he stated that,
even if the Florida decree were shown to be contrary to
the public policy of either state, that factor is not a ground
for refusing full faith and credit. 3 In essence, the dissent
charged that the majority opinion declared the Florida
judgment void merely because the majority disagreed with
the Florida court's construction of Florida law. The West
Virginia court might have held that (1) this action was
barred by limitations, (2) the land was not a part of the
husband's estate because both purported conveyances to
the sons were technically valid, or (3) the Florida divorce
decree, operative on the husband personally, could not have
extra-territorial effect upon his real property in West Vir-
ginia.'4 It is not clear why the West Virginia court chose
to ignore these possibilities.
The essential flaw is in the reasoning that: "It is nec-
essary to determine whether those provisions of the judg-
ment are valid under the law of the State of Florida,' u5 and
7127 S.E. 2d 385, 394 (1962).
8 Picking v. Local Loan Co., 185 Md. 253, 44 A. 2d 462 (1945) ; Coane v.
Girard Trust Co., 182 Md. 577, 35 A. 2d 449 (1944) ; Marin v. Angedahl,
247 U.S. 142 (1918); Mahaffa v. Mahaffa, 230 Iowa 679, 298 N.W. 916
(1941); Rock Springs Coal and Mining Co. v. Black Diamond Coal 0o.,
39 Wyo. 379, 272 P. 12 (1928).
9 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, rehearing denied, 321
U.S. 801, 150 A.L.R. 413 (1943) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ;
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) ; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S.
327 (1894) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 215 (3d ed. 1949).
10 Swift and Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Hart v. Smith, 159 Ind.
182, 64 N.E. 661, 58 L.R.A. 949, 95 Am. St. Rep. 280 (1902); Columbus
County v. Thompson, 249 N.C. 607, 107 S.E. 2d 302 (1959).
11 Of. authorities cited, note 6, 8upra.
1Hale v. Hale, 108 W. Va. 337, 150 S.E. 748 (1929).
"Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948) ; Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 801 (1943); Williams v.
State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) ; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S.
282 (1939); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1932), 456 et seq. "So far as
judgments are concerned, the decisions, as distinguished from dicta, show
that the actual exceptions have been few and far between .... "1 Williams
v. State of North Carolina, supra, 294-95. Cf. Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 562 (1905) ; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
1Epstein v. Epstein, 193 Md. 164, 66 A. 2d 381 (1949) ; Hood v. McGehee,
237 U.S. 611 (1915); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1909); Fall v.
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
"127 S.E. 2d 385, 390 (W. Va. 1962).
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the issue is simply: When enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment is sought in a forum, may the forum examine the
law of the foreign state to see if a particular judgment
rendered by the courts of that state is in accordance with
the authorities of that state?
The general principle is that a foreign judgment must
be given the same force and effect as it would in the state
in which it is entered.'6 If the majority's conclusion were
adopted, it seems that this principle would be frustrated.'7
The purpose and effect of the full faith and credit clause
"are to extend the res judicata effect of a judgment from
the state of its rendition to all other states,"'" and to avoid
retrying the case in another forum.
When a statute requires a court to exercise jurisdiction
in a particular manner or to a particular extent, and the
court acts in violation of such statutory directive, its act
is in excess of its jurisdiction and is void. 9 In the instant
case, the majority reasoned that jurisdiction to grant ali-
mony depends on divorce statutes and that the Florida
divorce statute 20 did not give the Florida court jurisdic-
tion to award this type of alimony. Yet, it is clear the
Florida divorce statute only sets out the means by which a
Florida court may order the payment of alimony; it does
not limit the exercise of a court's jurisdiction to award
1850 C.J.S. Judgments § 888b (1947). See also: 30A Am. Jur. Judgments
§ 236 (1958); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, rehearing
denied, 321 U.S. 801 (1943).
11 Cdane v. Girard Trust Co., 182 Md. 577, 35 A. 2d 449 (1944) ; Morris
v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra
note 16; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) ; 2 BLAcK, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1902) Ch.
22, § 861.
"There is a presumption of validity in a foreign judgment. Where
there is a doubt as to such validity, the court of a sister state should,
therefore, give effect to the unifying policy of Article IV, Section 1 of the
federal constitution in deciding whether to grant full faith and credit.
The Supreme Court in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268
(1935), stated at p. 276: "The very purpose of the full faith and credit
clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or
by judicial proceedings of others, and to make them integral parts of a
single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be
demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin." There has
been a growing trend in the decisions of the Supreme Court to strengthen
the force and effect of the full faith and credit clause. EHRENZWEIO, CON-
FLIcT oF LAWS §§ 57-60, pp. 202-212 (1959).
19 Burnett v. King, 33 Cal. 2d 805, 205 P. 2d 657, 12 A.L.R. 2d 333 (1949);
State ex rel Parsons v. Bushong, 92 Ohio App. 101, 109 N.E. 2d 692 (1945);
Allison v. Howell, 204 Oki. 404, 230 P. 2d 706 (1951). Excess of jurisdic-
tion implies that the judicial power is not in fact lawfully invoked. Malone
v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926) ; State em rel Smilock v. Bushong, 93
Ohio App. 201, 112 N.E. 2d 675 (1952); Garner v. Garner, 182 Ore. 549,
189 P. 2d 397 (1948).
05 FLA. STAT. ANNO. (1947) § 65.08.
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alimony.2 The court did not consider this point in its
opinion. The implication in the majority opinion that the
Florida court acted in excess of its jurisdiction is unwar-
ranted.
It seems that the West Virginia court has confused the
power to act at all, which is jurisdiction,22 with the exercise
of that power.2" "Lack of jurisdiction in the sense of lack
of power to act at all results in a judgment which is void
... while a so-called 'lack of jurisdiction', in the sense of
lack of power to render an erroneous decision, results in
a judgment which is valid until set aside."24 Jurisdiction
depends upon a court's right to hear and decide a cause
of action in the first instance and not upon the decision
of the court after jurisdiction has been acquired.25 "Juris-
diction of the particular matter does not mean simple jur-
21 Unlike divorce, alimony is a common law right, arising out of the
husband's obligation to provide sustenance for his wife; and according
to the weight of authority, an equity court "has inherent jurisdiction, in-
dependent of any action for divorce and irrespective f any statute, to
entertain a suit by a wife for alimony or separate maintenance . . ." 42
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 614b (1944). See Hite v. Hite, 210 Md. 576,
124 A. 2d 581 (1956) ; Comm. of Pa. for Use of Warren v. Warren, 204
Md. 467, 105 A. 2d 488 (1954) ; Woodcock v. Woodcock, 169 Md. 40, 179
A. 826 (1935). "After a court of equity, possessing the inherent power to
grant alimony, has once taken jurisdiction, its jurisdiction will not be
ousted because it does not have the power to do some of the things prayed
for in the bill." White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 24 S.E. 2d 448 (1943). Suits
for alimony irrespective of divorce are covered by statute in Florida (5
FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) § 65.09) as are suits for separate maintenanee (5
FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) § 65.10). These statutes, however, seem to be
sufficiently broad so as not to limit the inherent jurisdiction of the Florida
equity courts. St. Anne Airways, Inc. v. Webb, 142 S. 2d 142 (Fla. 1962) ;
Harmon v. Harmon, 40 S. 2d 209 (Fla. 1949) ; Kipplinger v. Kipplinger,
147 Fla. 243, 2 S. 2d 870 (1941) ; Howell v. Howell, 113 Fla. 129; 154 So.
328 (1933). See also: Daniel E. Murray, Separate Maintenance, 10 Miami
L.Q. 338 (1956) ; Daniel E. Murray, Survey of Domestic Relation Laws in
Florida, 12 U. of Miami L. Rev. 428 (1958).
Jurisdiction means no more than the power lawfully existing to hear
and deal with the general subject under which the case at bar falls.
Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 310 (1945) ; Thomp-
son v. Terminal Shares, 89 F. 2d 652 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 735; Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926).
Generally speaking "power" is used in reference to the means employed
in carrying jurisdiction into execution. 'Kendall v. U.S. (12 Peters) 37
U.S. 524, 622 (1838).
"A state may create or affect legal interests whenever its contacts
with a person, thing or occurrence are sufficient to make such action
reasonable. The power so to create or affect legal interests is 'juris-
diction' as 'that term is used in the Restatement of this subject. When
there has been compliance with the requirement of reasonableness ...
a state's exercise of power will not be refused recognition in other
states for lack of jurisdiction."
RESTATEMENT (Second) CONFLICT oF LAws § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
1 21 C.J.S. Courts § 27 (1940). See also: 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 19 (1947).
2 Erickson v. U.S., 264 U.S. 246 (1924); Hart v. Keith Exchange, 262
U.S. 271 (1923); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201
(1918) ; Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926).
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isdiction of the particular case when occupying the atten-
tion of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to
which the particular case belongs."28
Jurisdiction is not lost because of an erroneous decision,
however erroneous that decision may be. Whether the
Florida judgment is in fact erroneous is a matter which
the appellate court of Florida should determine.2 8 But, for
the West Virginia court to refuse full faith and credit, more
must be shown than that the Florida judgment is erroneous
or even voidable; it must appear that the judgment is
absolutely void.29
If a plaintiff in a case such as this case could convince
a court that the court of a sister state had improperly
exercised its jurisdiction, the right of any court to finally
decide a matter would be abridged. The court of one state
would be given thereby what is tantamount to quasi-
appellate jurisdiction over the court of a sister state.30
JOHN HENRY LEWiN, JR.
"Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 89 F. 2d 652 (8 Cir. 1937); Malone v.Meres, supra note 25; O'Brien v. People, 216 Il1. 354, 75 N.E. 108, 108 Am.
St. Rep. 219, 3 Am. Cas. 966 (1915) and cases cited therein.
'Picking v. Local Loan Co., 185 Md. 253, 44 A. 2d 462 (1945) ; Stephen-
son v. Kirtley, 269 U.S. 163 (1925) ; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, supra
note 26; Malone v. Meres, supra note 25.
2Assuming that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction, comity alone
would suggest that a determination of that question should first be de-
cided by the appellate court of Florida. Assuming the Florida judgment
to be incorrect in the light of past cases, it may be that the appellate
court of Florida would want to modify the state policy with reference to
such alimony payments for the reasons expressed by the dissent in Foster
v. Foster, 195 Va. 102, 77 S.E. 2d 471, 39 A.L.R. 2d 1397 (1953) :
"In a case of absolute divorce, if alimony payments upon which the
wife solely depends for her support stop with the death of the hus-
band, then regardless of the value of the husband's estate, she must
look to charity for help. She cannot otherwise share in her husband's
estate because a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony ex-
tinguishes her marital rights in his property."
Malone v. Meres, 190 So. 677 (Fla. 1926).
The leading case in Maryland dealing with the full faith and credit
clause is Coane v. Girard Trust Co., 182 Md. 577, 35 A. 2d 449 (1944).There the rule was stated: "Where a final judgment has been rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the full faith and credit clause of
the federal constitution precludes all inquiry into the merits of the ause
of 'action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the
legal principles involved, and the judgment is conclusive as to all defenses
which might have been interposed with proper diligence." It appears
therefore that the Aldrich case will not affect Maryland law. See Levin v.Singer, 227 Md. 47, 175 A. 2d 423 (1961); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86
A. 2d 463 (1952).
